

## CHAPTER XIII

# FREEDOM, SOLIDARITY, INDEPENDENCE: POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE “FIGHTING SOLIDARITY” ORGANISATION

KRZYSZTOF BRZECHCZYN

The goal of this article is to analyse the main lines of the political programme developed by the “Fighting Solidarity” organisation, centred on the three concepts given in the title, i.e. freedom, independence and solidarity. Since “*Fighting Solidarity*” is not prominently featured in books about Poland’s contemporary history, the first section of the article contains a brief description of the organisation’s history, while subsequent sections provide a description of the political thought developed by “*Fighting Solidarity*”. Section three contains an overview of the organisation’s attitude towards totalitarian communism; and section four, a synopsis of the idea of a “Solidary Republic”, which is in the political programme promoted by the organisation. The final section features a description of expectations of “*Fighting Solidarity*” members concerning the fall of communism and the consequential critical attitude of the negotiations conducted by representatives of “Solidarity” and the political opposition at the Round Table. Finally, the summary presents a concise evaluation of the organisation’s political thought.

### “FIGHTING SOLIDARITY” – A HISTORICAL OUTLINE

“*Fighting Solidarity*” was established by Kornel Morawiecki in Wrocław in June 1982<sup>1</sup>. The organisation was set up in response to growing disagreement between Władysław Frasyniuk and Kornel Morawiecki. The two activists were at variance as they promoted different methods of struggle with the communist system. In general, Frasyniuk claimed that social resistance should be a tool employed to force the authorities of the day to conclude another agreement with the society. Morawiecki contended that it should be a tool to oust the communists from power. When, in 1982 the communist party and government authorities turned down moderate

---

<sup>1</sup> The most extensive study on *Fighting Solidarity* is the work by Kornel Morawiecki entitled “*Geneza i pierwsze lata” Solidarności Walczącej*” [*Genesis and First Years of Fighting Solidarity*] available at <http://www.sw.org.pl>. Another work containing valuable information on this topic is A. Znamierowski's “*Zaciskanie pięści. Rzecz o Solidarności Walczącej*” [*Tightening Fist. Thinking About “Fighting Solidarity”*], Paris Editions Spotkania, 1988.

theses formulated by the Primate's Social Council, more radical underground activists were spurred to seek more dynamic forms of fighting the system, such as street demonstrations, broadcasts of the independent radio "S", spectacular leaflet campaigns and the like. Those who favoured more active methods of struggle with the communist power grew increasingly estranged with the passive attitude adopted by the management of the Regional Strike Committee of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union *Solidarity* of the Lower Silesia Region, and they embarked on setting up their own organisation (Myc, 1998, p. 19-20).

In their programme, the circle of "*Fighting Solidarity*" activists described their position as follows: "We regard ourselves as continuators of the radical current within the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union *Solidarity*" – a current that was marked at the First National Convention in the "Message to the working people of Eastern Europe" (*Ideology and Programme Principles of "Fighting Solidarity"*, p. 4). Kornel Morawiecki, the founder and leader of *Fighting Solidarity*, embarked on his opposition activities in 1968 by participating in student strikes and rallies held in Wrocław. In August 1968, he copied opposition leaflets in a protest against the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. In June 1979, Morawiecki joined the Social Self-Government Club, a Lower Silesia splinter of the Committee for Social Self-Defence (KSS KOR). In January 1980, together with Romuald Lazarowicz, Jan Waszkiewicz and Michał Wodziński, Morawiecki started publishing the "Lower Silesia Bulletin". Morawiecki was a delegate to the First National Convention of Delegates of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union, *Solidarity*. At the second round of the Convention, Morawiecki called upon Trade Union authorities to prepare a set of instructions in case martial law was declared and foreign invasion was imminent. After the publication of the "Appeal to Soviet Soldiers Stationed in Poland" and "Message of Free Trade Unions in Moscow to Solidarity" in the "Lower Silesia Bulletin", Morawiecki was arrested in September 1981. Under pressure from "Solidarity" and following surety granted by the highest authorities of Wrocław University of Technology, Morawiecki was released after 48 hours. Formal proceedings were carried out against Morawiecki in November and December 1981, but they were discontinued after the imposition of the martial law.

After 13 December 1981, Morawiecki was one of the members of the underground Regional Executive Committee of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union *Solidarity*, where he edited and printed the Union's newsletter called "*Z dnia na dzień*" ("Day to Day"). Alienated by the passive attitude of the regional management of the Trade Union, Morawiecki resigned from the function he had in the regional structures of the Union and set up his own organisation at the beginning of June 1982. The initial name of the new group was "*Fighting Solidarity*" Alliance, however it was soon (November 1982) transformed into "*Fighting Solidarity*" Organisation which declared itself as a social and political

association which, at the same time, allowed its members to belong to other political factions and social organisations.

The basic unit of "*Fighting Solidarity*" was one group, while several groups functioned in a given area formed as Branch. The first management body of the organisation was the Council of the "*Fighting Solidarity*" Alliance, made up of a dozen members or so, appointed in August 1982. On 11 November 1982, the Council was transformed into the Fighting Solidarity Council, headed by a chairman elected by Council members. The first chairmanship was given to Kornel Morawiecki, the founder of "*Fighting Solidarity*". Similar councils were also set up outside Wrocław, in such major centres of the organisation as Katowice, Lublin, Poznań and Gdańsk: however their scope of competence and authority was never established precisely. Since the Council failed to function efficiently, another body was established on 11 November 1985, called the Executive Committee. Members of the Committee included a number of close associates of Kornel Morawiecki, designated by the Council. In addition to sessions of the Council and the Executive Committee, there were also "city gatherings" of representatives of the largest centres of the organisation, held from 1983 onwards.

Gradually, branches of "*Fighting Solidarity*" were also created in other Polish cities. In 1987, they functioned in Gdańsk, Jelenia Góra, Katowice, Cracow, Lublin, Łódź, Poznań, Rzeszów, Szczecin, Toruń, Warsaw and Wrocław. Furthermore, "*Fighting Solidarity*" groups were active in several dozen other Polish towns. According to the 1987 census of the organisation, "*Fighting Solidarity*" published 20 different magazines and had two printing houses. In Wrocław, for example, the organisation published the "*Fighting Solidarity*" bi-weekly and "*Lower Silesia Bulletin*" monthly. Publishing flourished also at a number of regional branches of the organisation. For instance, the Cracow branch published the "*Free and Solidary*" and "*Katowice Underground Brochure*", the Gdańsk centre brought out the "Fighting Solidarity – Gdańsk Branch" newsletter, Poznań – the "*Fighting Solidarity*" biweekly and "Time", and Rzeszów "Galicja". According to Mateusz Morawiecki's estimates, "*Fighting Solidarity*" in 1984-86 had approximately 1.500 members, although another two for three thousand people supported the organisation at various times, with varying degrees of commitment and sense of identification with the organisation's programme<sup>2</sup>. The same author asserts that actions initiated by the organisation in Wrocław itself were supported by a group of 400-600 people. Besides Wrocław, major "*Fighting Solidarity*" centres included Katowice, Poznań and Trojmiasto.

On 7 November 1987, the Secret Police arrested Kornel Morawiecki together with Hanna-Lukowska-Karniej. The position of the organisation's chairman was then taken up by Andrzej Kołodziej who,

---

<sup>2</sup> M. Morawiecki, *Geneza i pierwsze lata "Solidarności Walczącej"* [Genesis and First Years of "Fighting Solidarity"] <http://www.sw.org.pl>.

however, was also apprehended by the Secret Police, 21 January 1988. Poland's authorities, in an attempt to avoid conducting sham legal proceedings and drumhead trials, tricked both "*Fighting Solidarity*" leaders (including Kołodziej, who was supposedly ill with cancer) into leaving the country. When it turned out that Kołodziej's diagnosis of disease was false, Morawiecki returned to Poland, on 4 May 1988. However, at the Okęcie airport in Warsaw he was put on a plane by force and sent away to Vienna. In July/August, Morawiecki went to the United States, only to come back to Poland illegally at the end of August 1988.

The developments that occurred in Poland in the first half of 1989 caused a radical change in the formula of the organisation's actions. In July 1989, Morawiecki appointed public representatives of "*Fighting Solidarity*". The group included Marek Czachor (Trójmiasto), Maciej Frankiewicz (Poznań), Antoni Kopaczewski (Rzeszów), Wojciech Myślecki (Wrocław). The autumn of 1989 saw the establishment of the legally functioning "Free and Solidary" Political Club in Wrocław. Later, at the end of 1989 and in early 1990, similar clubs were founded in other cities, such as Gorzów Wielkopolski, Kalisz, Cracow, Łódź, Poznań, Rzeszów and Szczecin. By forging local electoral alliances and coalitions, or by acting on their own, the clubs participated in local government elections. In the first half of 1990, in the wake of internal debates and the changing social and political situation in the country, Morawiecki decided to come out and set up a publicly operating organisation based on the existing "*Fighting Solidarity*" political clubs and branches. The Founding Convention of the new Freedom Party was held on 7 July 1990. The party's statutes and programme were officially adopted and Kornel Morawiecki was proposed as a candidate in the upcoming presidential elections. The propaganda effect of Morawiecki's disclosure was markedly weakened by the so-called "war at the top" which escalated at the end of June and at the beginning of July. Lech Wałęsa, who ran for the presidency under the banner of "acceleration", took over many of Morawiecki's potential supporters who were in favour of more radical political transformations. Ultimately, Morawiecki's candidacy was not registered by the State Election Commission on account of the inadequate number of votes supporting him as a presidential candidate.

This false start in the presidential elections, however, did not arrest the development of party structures. In 1991, the party started to publish a newspaper called "Days" in Wrocław. The paper was published three times a week. The Freedom Party ran independently in the first free parliamentary elections in 1991, registering its candidates in 24 constituencies. The party won 78,000 votes (0.7 percent), and won the majority in Wrocław – 9,500 votes (2.6 percent). In June 1992, the Freedom Party backed the vetting initiative proposed by the government of Jan Olszewski, staging nationwide demonstrations supporting the overthrown government and campaigning for the completion of the vetting process. Since the Freedom Party was not represented in the Parliament, it set out to seek allies for future elections.

The Second Convention of the Freedom Party, held in Wrocław in 1992, granted the party's management the authority to enter into talks with the Coalition for the Republic, a political party founded by Jan Olszewski. In the parliamentary elections of 1993, Freedom Party candidates were registered together with the Coalition for the Republic candidates. However, the alliance did not bring them success in the elections. In March 1995, at the Third Convention of the Freedom Party, Kornel Morawiecki announced dissolution of "Fighting Solidarity". At the same time, the Freedom Party changed its name into the Freedom Party–Fighting Solidarity. In the presidential elections of 1995, Morawiecki, not without some doubt, supported Jan Olszewski. After the elections, the Freedom Party – the "Fighting Solidarity" was collectively (and its members – individually)- incorporated into the emerging Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, which marked the end of independent political activity of the Freedom Party, that is, the "Fighting Solidarity".

### IN THE FACE OF TOTALITARIAN COMMUNISM

The first enunciation of the programme of "Fighting Solidarity" was the policy paper *Kim jesteśmy? O co walczymy?* [What are we? What are we fighting for?] published in September 1982. The ideological message presented in the paper was further developed in *Manifest Solidarności* [Solidarity Manifesto] published in December 1982. The main theses of the organisation's programme were also expounded in *Zasady ideowe* [Ideology principles] and *Program Solidarności Walczącej* ["Fighting Solidarity" Programme] published in June 1987. The author of all these documents explaining the policy of "Fighting Solidarity" was Kornel Morawiecki. The programme of the organisation, drawn up in 1987, contained several sections, including the *Declaration* which spelled out the principal ideological message proposed by the "Fighting Solidarity", six chapters and the *Summary*. The chapters had the titles: "Our assessment of the current situation", "Our vision", "Organisation", "Current policy" and "Prospects". The extensive document would provide a foundation for outlining the political thought promoted by the "Fighting Solidarity".

The organisation outspokenly opposed totalitarian communism – other terms, it used interchangeably with "communism" in the Programme include "socialism" and "real socialism". It defined communism in the following fashion:

Communism is an unjust and undemocratic system in which power is held by a limited group of the privileged, and collective opposition is suppressed by the police and the military. It is a system of wielding and centralising power for power's sake. Bureaucratic pressure restrains all activity and squanders social energy. Extensive areas of public life are subjected to the dictates of one secluded

group – the communist party *nomenklatura*. Restrictions in the exchange of ideas, achievements and business initiatives impoverish people and countries (*Ideology and Programme Principles of "Fighting Solidarity"*, p. 9).

One of the main theses of the political platform was that communism failed to respect basic human rights and freedoms. This thesis gave rise to passive social attitudes that eventually led to economic collapse. An argument supporting this claim of this inability of the was the comparison of the living standard of the people in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and that in the Federal Republic of Germany (BRD); those in North and in South Korea. For Polish society, Italy and Spain were invoked as examples which aptly illustrated the claimed discrepancies in development. Before WWII, Spain, Italy and Poland were on the same level of economic progress; in the post-war period, the gap between Poland and Spain/Italy grew dramatically.

Another threat posed by communism was the risk of uncontrolled nuclear bomb explosion, because weapons of mass destruction were in the hands of top communist party officials who were totally beyond the control of the society at large. Claims were made that:

Only if communism were transformed into a democratic political system, would the spectre of mass extermination disappear and make genuine disarmament possible to accomplish. Democracies do not pose a military threat either to one another or to other states. In turn, countries dominated by right-wing dictatorships do not have nuclear warheads and transform into democracies much more easily (*Ideology and Programme Principles of "Fighting Solidarity"*, pp. 10-11).

In their platform, "*Fighting Solidarity*" activists also abolished the myth of communism as a progressive and humanitarian political system. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia coincided with modernisation processes and the social rise of previously deprived social classes. These objectively occurring social processes were typically presented by the communist ideology as their own successes resulting from the transformation of the political system. Western intellectual circles were tricked by this ideological rhetoric, further substantiated by the participation of the Soviet Union in WWII and Soviet achievements in the early stage of the industrialisation process. However, in the face of the coming information-based civilisation, communism – which had "the monopoly [of] political power, means of production and the mass media" (*ibidem*, p. 11) – grew increasingly anachronistic, hampering further social development and progress of civilisation. Only a social system which can guarantee freedom of thought and initiatives, and endorse the pursuit of

truth and the good, is able to face emerging challenges and adapt to the progress brought about by civilisation. In this competition, communism was doomed to failure. The question remains, however, what kind of political system should replace it:

Residents of the so-called socialist camp feel that communism represents social evil, however they do not know what should substitute for it and how this should be accomplished. In Western democracies they admire general welfare, though they crave something more than just the pursuit of money. They feel antagonised by selfishness and [an] absence of deeper ideas prevalent in these societies – a feeling that is partially true but also to some extent, exaggerated by the communist propaganda. Not only do Western societies lead more affluent and honest lives, but they also lead a life of free people. And communism must be superseded with a system in which people will be free and solidary (*ibidem*, p. 11).

An alternative to communism and capitalism was expressed by the idea of the "Solidary Republic".

#### **BETWEEN COLLECTIVIST COMMUNISM AND INDIVIDUALIST CAPITALISM: THE IDEA OF "SOLIDARY REPUBLIC"**

The ideas of social solidarism were developed by Kornel Morawiecki some time before martial law was declared and before Morawiecki founded the "*Fighting Solidarity*". The term "Solidary Republic" first appeared in the announcement communicating the establishment of *Fighting Solidarity*, published in the *Fighting Solidarity* periodical on 1 August 1982. The original version of the solidarist system was presented in the *Solidarity Manifesto* issued in December 1982. The document provoked widespread debates in the underground press, and its author was often condemned for lack of political realism, for utopian ideas and a messianic attitude. Furthermore, Morawiecki faced a barrage of criticism for his proposal to "eliminate large ownership" which, incidentally, disappeared from subsequent versions of the organisation's programme<sup>3</sup>. In its most mature form, the idea of social solidarism was expressed in *Ideology. Principles* and *Fighting Solidarity Programme*.

The idea of social solidarism was already manifest in the organisation's motto, "Free and Solidary". Members of the organisation were required to swear an oath in which they undertook to fight for a "free and independent Solidary Republic" and "solidarity between people and

---

<sup>3</sup> The debate is recounted in the chapter "*Assumptions of the Programme of "Fighting Solidarity"*" in M. Morawiecki's work.

nations". Solidarism, claimed in the axiological assumptions of the Programme was to be developed in three dimensions: political, economic and international.

The paragraph, "Man and the Society" of the chapter "Our Values" gives an outline of how people depend on their social surroundings:

People create communities, build civilisations and, at the same time, are moulded by them. Human beings are born as children of God, their family and homeland, as residents of a specific region and citizens of their state. People's personalities grow mature in a tight relationship with the surrounding environment which they gradually shape by entering into various groups and relations. This is precisely how people as members of the community discover and explore truth and beauty, accept and do justice and good (*ibidem*, p. 6).

In line with the Programme, each individual belonged to a number of communities at the same time:

We all live united and, at the same time, divided into different cultures, religions, races and nations, social strata and classes, states and blocs. These and other communities, both wider and narrower, delineated by clear or blurred boundaries, carry, convey and exchange values and ideas. However, in the long run, only those communities whose members are prepared to take actions and suffer sacrifices for the common good are able to thrive and advance their values (*ibidem*, p. 6).

In a wide range of human communities, the Programme attached particular importance to the national community: "Nations are extremely significant human communities. Nations pass on to their citizens and to humanity at large treasures of tradition, culture and language scrupulously accumulated by successive generations. All nations have a right to independence" (*ibidem*, p. 6).

As far as values were concerned, freedom and solidarity received particular mention in the Programme as basic values: "We can and we should be free and solidary. The centuries-long human desire for a better life for oneself and one's [closest] and dearest [ones] requires concern for others and for communities, which have contributed to shaping each and every individual. The destiny of an individual is always inextricably linked to the fate of the nation and civilisation, to the preceding and following generations" (*ibidem*, p. 6). Other fundamental values included the right to live, freedom of religion and beliefs, the right to unrestrained work,



production initiatives and creativity, tolerance and respect for diversity, democracy, and the principle of participation in public life and peace.

In terms of political system, the Programme clearly favoured parliamentary democracy and division of authority into judicial, executive and legislative sections. However, certain deficiencies of parliamentary democracy based on political parties were also pointed out indirectly. It was argued that system, which give rise to a vertical relation (democratic) authority over the citizen ultimately lead to the alienation of the state, even if the latter is legal and democratic. In order to avoid this alienation, a fourth branch of authority was proposed – one that would represent self-government on levels of the region, trade union and labour. The fourth authority would take over certain functions of the state machinery, act as counterweight, articulate the needs of its members, represent their interests in disputes with the administration and mediate in conflicts between regions and professional groups. Compromise-seeking would be based on the principle of solidarity and common good. Self-governing authority would protect citizens against potential dictates by the party coming to power after victory in elections and would enhance citizen participation in public life. An institutional culmination of self-government would be a “self-governing parliamentary chamber” or a “self-governing Senate”. In the opinion of the author of the Programme, the proposed “democracy enrichment” was in line with general trends marking the progress of civilisation, including educational improvement, a sense of being a social subject and of independence.

In the social and economic spheres, the author of the Programme endeavoured to combine the principles of market economy with the ideal of social solidarity. In the chapter *Our Values*, the free market was described as the most economically viable alternative. Well-known arguments were invoked at this point, claiming that the realisation of individual interests had to be associated – via free market exchange – with the fulfilment of the needs of other social groups. At the same time, however, the Programme pointed to the fact that free market invariably results in material stratification and the emergence of dramatic differences in material status between the rich and the poor. As Morawiecki asserted, “ It tears apart social relationships and frequently leads to a subjective feeling of injustice or to a state of resignation or defiance in the poorer social strata” (*ibidem*, p. 7). Consequently, the free market economy had to be enhanced by a system of progressive taxes and social expenditures incurred by the state. These measures, however, should be employed with great caution, for the redress of inequalities inevitably strains free market mechanisms, which typically reward hard work, resourcefulness and perseverance. This is the reason why democratic rule provides the best setting for the free market system. The idea is expounded in detail in the chapter entitled *Our Vision*. The proposed market economy system incorporated the idea of equal status among diverse forms of ownership: private property, co-operative property, local government property, share property, social property and state ownership,

as well as among various forms of management. At the same time, however, the Programme was opposed to maintaining any monopoly in any form of organisation of production, stating that “there are no universal solutions that would define optimum proportions of any given form of ownership, tax policy or management methods (*ibidem*, p. 12). The Programme also accounted for the then unknown problem of unemployment by dividing people into three categories: those who want to work, those who want to work but for various reasons, e.g. ill health or disability decline of a given profession or being defeated in the recruitment process are incapable of working, and finally those who do not work because they do not want to. The fundamental rule of social solidarism requires that people representing the second group be provided with daily maintenance and assistance in retraining and finding a job.

A problem arose in the process of defining a social policy that would accommodate a marginal, as it was assumed, group of people who “do not want to study or retrain, who do not want to work” (*ibidem*, p. 13). All in all, it was recognised that it might be difficult to tell “unemployment resulting from maladjustment, incapacity or mental breakdown from laziness and reluctance to work in general” (*ibidem*, p. 13). The Programme of “*Fighting Solidarity*” assumed that since the existence of each and every individual carries an independent value for the society as a whole, each individual should be provided with subsistence allowances as a practical sign of solidarity of the general public with the individual. Although the Programme took notice of the fact that:

such a solution violates the economic laws of the market [...] but the contemporary flexible labour and capital markets, as well as goods and services markets, are sources of such enormous material development that people will not become poor if they support the life of every individual in this way (*ibidem*, p. 13).

The systemic proposals thus outlined were to form a basis for a new political and social system referred to as “solidarism“. The Programme purposely refrained from spelling out precisely what institutions would implement the main assumptions of solidarism, since:

A general principle of solidarity of free citizens will be more important than these. The idea of solidarity is a transplantation of the Christian commandment to love your neighbour into mutual relationships connecting different social groups, as well as individuals and the community. It is this very idea that we want to use as a foundation for our “Solidary Republic” (*ibidem*, p. 13).

According to the Programme, the principle of solidarism should also be accommodated in the field of international relations. Manifestations of international solidarity include a sense of natural compassion and aid provided to regions afflicted by famine or natural disasters. This, however, is much too little. The existing United Nations organisation fails adequately to address all issues in its scope, for the majority of the UN member states are not ruled democratically. The UN, it was claimed, should be substituted with the Organisation of Free Democratic Nations. The body would support "resistance movements for independence" in subjugated non-democratic countries by providing humanitarian and material aid, IT [information technology] assistance and – in extreme cases – also military help. The Programme of "*Fighting Solidarity*" also contained declarations of abandonment of any territorial claims against Poland's neighbouring countries: Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. Such claims, it was asserted, should also be renounced by all nations remaining under direct or indirect authority of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which, after winning independence, should preserve their current boundaries, since otherwise "disputes of secondary importance would obscure the overriding goals of independence and liberation from communism" (*ibidem*, p. 14).

#### **DOWNFALL OF COMMUNISM. EXPECTATIONS AND REALISATIONS**

As he set out to found "*Fighting Solidarity*", Kornel Morawiecki clearly and unambiguously stated his intention to oust the communists from power: "Appreciating the role of compromise in the accomplishment of political goals, we reject the possibility of any agreements with the communists, for they disregard and violate any arrangements that would restrict their power whenever they have an opportunity. We want to remove these authorities from power and establish a democratic government" (*ibidem*, p. 16).

In his political platform, Morawiecki distinguished three main stages of abolishing communism. Stage A was to force the authorities to adopt reforms in order to enable a more effective struggle with the social and economic crises. This stage ought to witness a restriction on the state repressive involvement in political activity and an abolition of the state's information monopoly. In the field of economy, Morawiecki forecast a slowdown in the development of the military industry and a decrease in the scope of state ownership accompanied by an increased scope of authority and responsibility of workers' self-governments, recognition of peasant ownership and abolition of the state monopoly in the trade sector.

Stage B, Morawiecki contended, should see growing participation of independent social forces in ruling the country. This stage should also feature subjectification processes within the society, including the restoration of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union, "Solidarity",

and other trade unions that were outlawed during martial law. Society should also be granted the right of association and the right to create worker self-government structures above the factory level. In addition, this stage should accomplish the removal of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) from workplaces, complete emancipation of enterprises, debureaucratisation of the national economy and privatisation of State Agricultural Enterprises (the so-called PGR farms). It is also in this phase that democratic elections for local governments should be held.

Stage C should be marked by a pursuit of political pluralism in Poland and by the regaining of full independence. New political parties and factions should be founded. Free and democratic elections should be staged. As for international relations, authorities selected in democratic elections should campaign for the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Poland and verify trade and business contracts concluded by Poland with adjacent countries. While recognising that his forecasts were merely hypothetical estimates, Morawiecki prepared a schedule of transformations: "The division into consecutive stages listed above should serve as a means of imposing order. We will be glad if reality surpasses our expectations. Generally, we expect stages A and B to be completed in the first half of the 1990s and stage C by the end of the century" (*ibidem*, p. 18).

In addition to the option recounted above, measures were also taken to prepare for the revolution-based course of events by working out a concept of active strikes in the production area. In the case of worker crises, a special Workers Council on strikes should be appointed to take over control of this area. The management and administration of an enterprise would report to the Workers Council. Those who refused would be removed from the company together with Polish United Workers' Party and Secret Police units. Each enterprise and plant would have its own industry guard and workers' militia. Also, the establishment of councils to deal with inter-factory strikes was postulated. The bodies should pave the way for self-governing worker authorities and supervise production and procurement in their areas.

The negotiated fall of communism which was realised in social reality did not, however, correspond to the predictions made by "*Fighting Solidarity*" (neither in the evolutionary, nor – even less so – in the revolutionary variant). Criticism of the compromise reached during the Round Table negotiations, "contract-based" elections and the policy of "thick stroke" followed by the government headed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki become fully understandable if one notes what the top activists of "*Fighting Solidarity*" thought of Gorbachev's *perestroika* and transformations taking place in Eastern Europe, for the Round Table compromise was just a local variant of a larger-scale trend. In this area, the position of both the top *Fighting Solidarity* officials and the grassroots corresponded closely to the ideas of A. Besancon whose articles and statements were often reprinted in the *Fighting Solidarity* periodicals. The French sovietologist compared Gorbachev's *perestroika* with the Russian NEP (New Economic Policy).

*Perestroika*, Besançon argued, came down to temporary and superficial concessions made by communists, to which they agreed only because they had to overcome temporary difficulties and intended to return to the offensive. After *perestroika*, Besançon maintained, the communist power was to grow even stronger, and repressions against the society even harsher. Holding these beliefs, Morawiecki and the *Fighting Solidarity* structures remained in the underground because of the anticipated policy turn initiated by the authorities. However, the Autumn of Nations of 1989 and the events occurring in early 1990 proved Besançon's predictions wrong.

Besançon's ideas were critically developed by Alfred B. Gruba, a "Fighting Solidarity" activist and publicist<sup>4</sup>. Gruba asserted that *perestroika* was not merely a tactical compromise but precisely what it claimed to be, i.e. a radical reconstruction of the system. The aim of this was to eradicate the party structure and conduct reprivatisation that would leave the key sectors of the country's economy in the hands of the *nomenklatura*. Such selective transformation into a market-oriented economy would then foster the emergence of a class of owners related by their social environment and biographies with the circle of political rulers and the development of state-independent middle class. Thanks to this strategy, the political system would be stable and based on the loyalty of new owners (Gruba, 1990, p. 14-16; 1991, p. 1-4).

It is not surprising, therefore, that the evolution-based transition from communism to democracy, effected in the period 1988-1991 by constructive opposition, faced a barrage of criticism from "Fighting Solidarity". Kornel Morawiecki condemned the very idea of talks between the communist state and the society, which he regarded as utterly anachronistic. One distinct feature of democratic systems, Morawiecki claimed, is that political authorities are elected by members of the society and thus the communist state could not act as a party to any negotiations. In Morawiecki's view, reforms carried out by the Polish United Workers' Party were only superficial and their only goal was to neutralise political opposition. In addition, involvement in a morally dubious agreement with the communists dissipated social energy and time. Before the commencement of the Round Table negotiations, Morawiecki wrote:

Evolution of the system – agreed – but an evolution gradually eradicating the system, not sanctioning and preserving it. The evolution must, therefore, be quick enough for liberation and growth of social subjectivity to precede the inherent degradation and sovietisation of communism. It is inappropriate to delude anyone with a purely evolutionary perspective. Agitation of masses is inevitable. Communism will not recede just like that, on its own. Upheaval will occur regardless of whether the system will close up or open up. In the former case, it will take the form of

---

<sup>4</sup> Józef Darski and Jerzy Przystawa, popular "Fighting Solidarity" publicists, wrote in the same spirit.

suppressed despair, in the latter – outbursts of aroused hope [Morawiecki, 1989, p. 1].

After the start of negotiations, the role of “*Fighting Solidarity*”, in Morawiecki’s view, was to “raise the bar” of demands:

Although we do not directly participate in this round of the game, we care a lot about the outcome, about winning full and legitimate “Solidarity”. With our whole hearts and minds, we vigorously support the social team. With our organised presence alone we will provide Walesa with trump cards, we will pull up the stake. However, our duty is also to look at the cards held by our players, assess their bids and leads [*ibidem*, p. 2].

Criticism emerged in response to the methods of the negotiations held between “*Solidarity*” and the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) – and also to the details of their political deal. Aspects that were criticised included: the permission to legalise *Solidarity* again; amendments to the statute which deprived the Union of the right to strike. Instead, demands were raised to relegalise Solidarity (the same formula was used in the case of the Independent Students’ Association, NZS). There were calls to boycott contractual elections. Change of the electoral law effected between the first and the second round of elections and Walesa’s support for the national list were publicly condemned. “*Fighting Solidarity*” staged country-wide demonstrations against the election of Wojciech Jaruzelski to the office of President of the Polish People’s Republic. When Mazowiecki accepted the post of the Prime Minister, criticism was levelled at the participation of communist ministers in his government and the fabian tactics employed by the “Solidarity-based” government.

In the period 1989-1991, Fighting Solidarity campaigned for the acceleration of political changes in Poland. The establishment of the Freedom Party on 7 July 1990 was accompanied by a formulation of a party platform which came down essentially to the problem of how to abolish, as soon as possible, the political arrangement which resulted from the Round Table talks. The party demanded the immediate resignation of Mazowiecki’s administration and the establishment of a temporary government based on an agreement among all forces on the Polish political scene, except for communists and their followers. The next task of the temporary government would be to lead to Jaruzelski’s deposition and self-dissolution of the Sejm and Senate. The Freedom Party did not claim that the contract-based Parliament was entirely socially unrepresentative, for its “Solidarity-associated” section was to be incorporated in the National Assembly which would then prepare new electoral regulations to be able to hold fully free parliamentary and presidential elections in 1990. Until the elections, the function of the temporary Head of State would be held by Ryszard Kaczorowski, the official President of the Republic of Poland in

exile. In the same period, the temporary government would give up Balcerowicz's Plan, adopt complete vetting and decommunisation, publicly disclose the Secret Police files, subordinate the military and the police, withdraw Poland from the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw Pact, recognise the independence of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, as well as other former USSR Republics eager to achieve sovereignty and, finally, inform Western creditors that it did not feel responsible for any debts incurred by the communist government before 1989.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In the political sphere, the party platform outlined in this paper was an example of radical anticommunist thought, while in business it was a result of searching for “the third way” between capitalism and socialism. Let me discuss the former first.

It was history's major paradox that the visionary political postulates put forward by Morawiecki, not the cool-headed calculations offered by realists, were put into practice. However, they were in fact realised by those who initially accused Morawiecki of cherishing utopian ideas and political day-dreaming. At present, no one questions the justifiability of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland or Poland's withdrawal from the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), free elections or the right of the former Baltic Republics of the Soviet Union to the status of independent states. If these proposals had not been implemented, Poland would not now be an EU Member State or a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although Morawiecki's critique of the great compromise between the communists and the constructive opposition may be described as somewhat naive and idealistic, ignoring the genuine interests of parties participating in the compromise (including the Solidarity-based and the opposition-based camps), it should be noted that Morawiecki's vision had a solid rational core. He repeatedly stressed that the society was largely devoid of enthusiasm, apathetic and passive, which is why even the best reforms, planned entirely in good faith, would be impossible to implement (Morawiecki 1990, p. 3)<sup>5</sup>. The main reason was – so Morawiecki maintained – the dilly-dally policy of small steps adopted by top “Solidarity” activists and later by Mazowiecki's government. This is precisely why there was no clear breakthrough date (comparable to 11 November 1918) that is associated with the birth of the new Third Republic of Poland. The coalescence of political changes featured in the political platform of the Freedom Party was to compensate for the lack of breakthrough, giving Poles the feeling of freedom and

---

<sup>5</sup> Attention was drawn to this aspect by A. Łaszcz, another “*Fighting Solidarity*” publicist (1980).

unleashing much needed social passion. As Zdzisław Krasnodębski noted many years later:

No foundation myth [...] of the renewed Republic, the Third Republic of Poland, was created. The Round Table was definitely unbecoming as a myth. Due to the fact that the value- and emotion-laden conflict ended neither in a revolutionary outbreak nor in outright victory which could bring about emotional catharsis, but was founded on a rational and calculated compromise, there was no place and, it also appeared, no need for symbols and emotions (Krasnodębski, 2003, p. 89).

Problems with establishing the foundation myth of the Third Republic are also noted by Jakub Karpiński: "Attempts were made to turn Round Table negotiations into such a foundation myth, asserting that general Kiszczak was a co-author of Poland's independence, while the road to independence was mapped in the Ministry of Internal Affairs villa in Magdalenka" (Karpiński, 2001, p. 310). The mythical potential of the Round Table, however, turned out to be rather limited. Note that the participants in the negotiations representing the coalition-government's negotiating party made a major contribution to the popular demythification of the Round Table legend when, on the tenth anniversary of the compromise, they published previously unreleased photographs and footage showing that the talks were held in Magdalenka in a very festive and social atmosphere.

The situation is slightly different with the evaluation of proposals for a political system based on social solidarity which stemmed from the programme platform developed during the Solidarity revolution. In comparison with the "Self-Governing Republic" platform adopted at the First National Convention of Delegates of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "*Solidarity*", the "Solidarity Republic" blueprint feature, a range of essential new aspects, such as approval of a free-market economy and private property. Consequently, social solidarity was:

[A]n adaptation of democratic capitalism which takes into account the experiences and failures of decades of communism and the social situation shaped in the course of all these years. Shortage of solidarity in classic capitalism is a flaw that communism demagogically brings up and presents as an example of its supposed "systemic superiority". Solidarity, in our interpretation, accents the importance of solidarity on the level of principles and institutions, while being essentially a variation of capitalism, though one heading in a good direction, towards consolidation of interpersonal bonds, at the same



time without absolutising the state; it claims superiority of sharing over consumption but does not lead to any homogenisation, depreciation of aspirations or needs (*Ideology and Programme Principles of “Fighting Solidarity”*, pp. 13-14).

Evaluations of the platform are thus closely related to the global assessment of “Solidarity” as a movement. Andrzej Walicki, in his critique of the political foundations of the Polish opposition made a distinction between liberalisation and democratisation of the system. Liberalisation consists of limiting the scope of the ruling authority (e.g. by lack of central regulation of the economy); while democratisation meant participation in power. The basic political error committed by the Polish opposition was, therefore, to ignore the liberalisation of the political system which was manifest – e.g. in the recognition of private ownership in the nation’s economy – and the demand for democratisation of the system. Meanwhile, Walicki argues, dictatorial authority would be more eager to accept a certain limitation of the scope of its power (e.g. by the sphere of the economy) than to offer the society a share in its ruling power. The same mistake, Walicki maintains, was made by “Solidarity” which called for the democratisation of real socialism, not liberalisation. In Walicki’s words:

The idea of solidarity was conceived of as a collective guarantee that no worker will lose [his] usual living standard and no social group will grow rich at the expense of other groups in the process of reforms. It is, indeed, [an] imagined normal free-market competition in such circumstances. In theory, the Union was in favour of the separation between politics and economy; however, in practical terms the Union’s programme called for replacement of the state’s control of the economy with the Union’s control. The Union perceived freedom not only as autonomy, but also – and above all – as unhindered participation. At the same time, it was considered obvious that all spheres of social life, economy included, can be regulated by conscious and democratic decisions. The Union’s platform was thus a programme of maximum *democratisation* of control of the economy, not a programme assuming a limitation of this control by exposing workers to anonymous and ruthless laws of the market (Walicki, 2000, p. 26-27).

From the liberal point of view advanced by Walicki, social and economic aspects of the political platform of “Fighting Solidarity” can be analysed as another variant of democratisation (or societalisation) of the economy centred on workers’ self-governments instead of trade unions. As

such, the “*Fighting Solidarity*” programme can be seen as a continuation, in the purest form, of utopian and impracticable elements of the “Solidarity” revolution. The best choice would have been to abandon it outright.

Krasnodebski analyses “Solidarity” from a slightly different perspective. In his view, the practice of the Solidarity trade union was a Polish variant of republicanism combined with the idea of participatory democracy. Republicanism, Krasnodebski argues, is rooted in exactly the same values as liberalism, e.g. liberty of individual citizens. However, the guarantee of liberty is different in the two systems (Krasnodebski 2003, p. 280-285). “In the republican tradition – Krasnodebski notes – liberty is not to be equated with negative freedom, understood as an absence of external interference, but rather independence of foreign authority which enslaves even if it does not interfere with the liberty sphere of the subordinate” (*ibidem*, p. 281). The freedom of an individual can be guaranteed only by the freedom of all citizens which, in turn, is determined by the independence of the nation to which a given individual belongs. Consequently, the state is not regarded as a structure which poses a threat to individual civic liberties or as a neutralistic framework which makes it possible to accomplish selfish individual preferences, but rather, it is treated as the common good, *res publica*, “the public thing” of all citizens.

Participatory democracy, advanced by the so-called New Left movement, is considered as an important complement of the model of liberal democracy, capable of overcoming its inherent weaknesses: the alienation of elites, growth of the bureaucracy and the withdrawal of citizens from public life (Krasnodebski 2003, p. 74-76). Freedom in the period 1980-81 was understood as an ability for self-government, independence of arbitrary communist power and joint actions undertaken to achieve collective goals. In this sense, solidarity was a synthesis of the right-wing thought (republicanism) and left-wing thought (participatory democracy). As Krasnodebski summarises:

Solidarity [...] was [...] a liberation-oriented republican movement with a range of unique features. It shared one central thing with liberalism, namely the idea of freedom of [the] individual [...], however it understood that freedom differently, knowing that one cannot be free as an individual as long as Poles as citizens will be dependent on the communist authority (Krasnodebski 2003, p. 293).

Considering the above, the political platform of “*Fighting Solidarity*” can be viewed as a specific Sarmatian version of republicanism combined with the idea of participatory democracy and the pursuit of the “third way” in economic issues. It was positioned somewhere between collectivist communism and individualist capitalism. The political system proposed by “*Fighting Solidarity*”, drawing inspiration from Polish experiences and sources, was never seriously debated, either by “*Fighting*

*Solidarity*” or by other, ostensibly more influential organisations (including the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “*Solidarity*” which, at the First National Convention adopted a programme for a “Self-Governing Republic”, inspired by the ideas of Edward Abramowski and the social teaching of the Roman Catholic Church). It seems worthwhile to reflect on why the ideological solidaristic aspects vanished not only from the platforms adopted by major post-Solidarity political forces after 1989 but also from the public debate in general. The reasons can be divided into external and internal.

As regards “*Fighting Solidarity*”, it is relatively easy to identify internal factors which contributed to the phenomenon. The *Freedom Party* which grew out of the organisation was dominated by a young generation of activists who treated all solidaristic aspects and associations with “Solidarity” as unnecessary ballast. Accordingly, in the platform accepted at the First Convention of the *Freedom Party* in 1990, there was no mention of a self-governing parliamentary chamber. Instead, the Party officially endorsed “the republican political system and combined presidential and parliamentary government” (*The Freedom Party. Platform and Statute*, p. 4) and declared reinstatement of the Constitution of 1935 ensuring continuity of power. In the economy section of the *Platform*, claims were made that “private ownership was the dominant form”, while “the role of the state in economy should be limited to a minimum” (*ibidem*, p. 5). In this aspect, the *Freedom Party* wanted to become a typical right-wing liberal group. On the other hand, it aspired to be different in terms of hardline anti-communism, disapproval of the compromise reached with the communists and an independence-centred programme, including the demand that Soviet troops leave Poland, withdrawal from the, uncil for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw Pact, and support for the national liberation ambitions of the former Soviet Republics. In practice, however, all solidarity-related aspects faded to the background – an event that resulted in a somewhat eclectic format and in a lack of programme homogeneity.

Virtually, the only demonstration of solidaristic ideas was the high degree of interest shown by the press, published by “*Fighting Solidarity*”, as the idea of an employee benefit scheme called the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). However, social circles favouring this type of ownership were too lacking in influence politically to turn the ESOP into one of methods of the state’s privatisation policy.

There were also a number of external factors independent of ideological solutions approved by members of the organisation that deserve a mention.

“*Fighting Solidarity*” was a party that opposed compromise with the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) with utmost vehemence. Therefore, the anticommunist and independence-oriented goals of the organisation came, by the natural course of things, to the forefront in the social reception, whereas the solidarity-centred visions of the political

system did not. Criticism of the Round Table talks led to the marginalisation of the entire organisation in the years 1988-1991 and, along with it, solidarist elements of the political platform which were developed only sketchily and incompletely during martial law.

As regards the marginalisation of social solidarism by “serious” constructive opposition stemming from the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “*Solidarity*” of 1980-1981, it seems that factors determining the course of transformations in Poland and external circumstances were its likely causes. Transformations contributed to the emergence of the so-called political capitalism, i.e. a social system in which the class of owners who were originally representatives of the communist *nomenklatura* had tight connections with the ruling system. Solidarity-based ideas calling for grassroots-initiated social transition and social participation were dysfunctional in this social system.

In addition, the fall of communism and the transformation of real socialism coincided with the revival of neoliberalism advocated e.g. by the governments of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. It was, therefore, only natural that transformations sweeping through Poland and other countries were interpreted in the categories of the liberal thought which, at the time, achieved a dominant position globally (or at least in the Euro-Atlantic civilisation). In this framework, the transformation of Eastern Europe was regarded as a process whose chief goal was to make up for many centuries of “modernisation backlog” (accumulated not only during the period of real socialism), consisting, for the major part, in the transplantation of established Western institutions into the newly emerged independent Eastern European states. A genuine triumph of the liberal ideology occurred when Francis Fukuyama made his well-known declaration of the “end of history” which would occur along with the (preferably global) establishment of parliamentary democracy and free-market economy.<sup>6</sup> Liberalism, which triumphed (perfectly legitimately) over its ideological opponent (communism-inherent collectivism), at the same time, defined the Polish viewpoint of the society and the economy after 1989 and marginalised (unfairly) all ideological alternatives.

*Institute of Philosophy*  
*Adam Mickiewicz University*  
*Poznań, Poland*

## REFERENCES

Brzechczyn Krzysztof, *O wielości linii rozwojowych w procesie historycznym* [About Plurality of Developmental Lines in Historical Process], Poznań 2004.

---

<sup>6</sup> A historiosophical analysis of Fukuyama’s views is presented in Brzechczyn 2004, pp. 11-13.

Gruba Alfred B., *Co to jest "pierestrojka"* [*What it is This "pierestrojka"*], [in] "Biuletyn Dolnoslaski" February 1990, no. 2(95), pp. 1-20.

Gruba Alfred B., *"Solidarność Walcząca" na zakręcie*, [*"Fighting Solidarity" - on Turning*] [in] *"Solidarność Walcząca"* [in] *"Fighting Solidarity"*, 1-15 April 1991, no. 8(276), pp. 1-4.

Karpiński Jakub, *Trzecia niepodległość. Najnowsza historia Polski*, [*Third Independence. The Newest History of Poland*] Warszawa Klub Świata Książki, 2001.

Krasnodębski Zdzisław, *Demokracja peryferii*, [*Democracy of Periphery*] Gdańsk Słowo/Obraz/Terytoria 2003.

Łaszczyński Andrzej, *Konieczność uświadamiania – bez euforii*, [*Without Euphoria. Necessity Informing*] [in] "Biuletyn Dolnośląski", September 1989, no. 9, pp. 1-7.

Morawiecki Kornel, *Reformować czy obalać?* [*To Reform or To Overthrow*] [in] *"Solidarność Walcząca"*. Pismo organizacji Solidarność Walcząca 20 II – 5 III 1989, no. 4(199), Wrocław, pp. 1-2.

Morawiecki Kornel, *Nie poszliśmy na ugodę z komunistami*, [*We Did not go on Agreement With Communist*] [in] "Obserwator Wielkopolski", 15 August 1990, no. 19 (155), pp. 3-4 and 10.

Morawiecki Mateusz, *Geneza i pierwsze lata "Solidarności Walczącej"*, [*Origin and First Flies "Fighting Solidarity"*] M.A. thesis defended at the Faculty of History of the University of Wrocław (available on the website devoted to "Fighting Solidarity" at <http://www.sw.org.pl>).

Myc Andrzej, *"Solidarność Walcząca" była organizacją czynnego oporu*, [*"Fighting Solidarity" was the Organization of Active Resistance*] [in] *"Solidarność Walcząca"*. Kwartalnik polityczny 1998, no. 2 (231), pp. 18-24.